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Abstract 
The world of professional sports franchise ownership is like any other big time, big money 
business. Focusing on Major League Baseball, this paper will examine how and why baseball franchises 
pay their players such large amounts of money and still maintain high valuation. To understand why a 
team can manage in this fashion, the paper will also examine how the teams operate and presents an 
explanation of the basic theories of valuation and operation of a sport franchise, as well an in depth 
analysis of the valuation of selected professional teams. The most important variable of the value 
equation Is cost, whose largest component is salaries. The trends of professional baseball player salaries 
throughout the hiStory of the game, as well as the reasons behind the trends will explain how salaries 
have grown to their current levels. Important in salary analysis is evaluating team financial performance 
and evaluation of player performance. This paper outlines some of the available methods of player 
performance evaluation, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of these methods, and outline some of 
the major implications, on an off the field, that are determined by team and player value. In the end, the 
overall analysis of the value equation related to professional baseball allows for a little "cents" to be made 
out of baseball. 
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Introduction 
The economic and institutional infrastructure of Major League Baseball has become the source of 
much public controversy and concern. When one sits down to read the sports section in the newspaper, 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to understand the sports news without a background in business, 
finance, or economics. Having to sift through reports of multimillion dollar contracts, franchise sales, and 
debates over revenue sharing and lUXUry taxes, it is often times difficult to find out who won and how. 
In sports, the score is kept in terms of wins and loses. Not all teams are equally successful, and 
not all teams perform to their full potential. Much like finance, the score is kept in dollars and cents. 
Some teams are prosperous and some are not, and some fall shorts of their financial performance. 
These financial performances not only are the push behind the direction of the team, but often times 
have major implications for on and off of the field success (Sheehan 1996). 
By analysis the valuation of professional baseball teams, understanding their operation and 
finances, looking at how salaries have changed over the history of "America's pastime," and offering 
methods to calculate team and player performance statistics, a relationship should be established 
between salaries and team valuation. 
Valuation 101 - A Basic Understanding 
The basic equation for value is to measure the present value of future earnings or incomes. This 
is the fundamental theory of finance. Income is found by taking the difference between revenues and 
costs. Revenues of a professional baseball team would include tickets and merchandise sales, parking 
fees, concessions, and advertisements such as in-park signage or announcements just to name a few. 
Other outside factors that influence revenues but are not necessarily measurable in dollar amounts are 
the stadium, star players, and winning records. The main organizational goal, behind winning of course, 
would be to make money. To make money, a team must increase their revenues and at the same time 
decrease costs. Some of the more measurable costs of a professional team include stadium debt, the 
costs of operation such as wages of team and park staff, and professional player salaries. Salaries are 
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the key to cost, because they are the largest expense of a professional baseball team, which is what this 
paper attempts to prove. If team owners could figure out a way to decrease their salaries and expenses, 
but still keep the revenues coming in, their value would rocket through the roof. 
Capital budgeting decisions are one of the tools that can be used by management of a 
professional team to attempt to decrease strategies. Ultimately the strategic move would be to assure 
that long-term costs are less than the revenue that is generated. It can also be stated, as long-term 
revenues must be greater than long-term costs. This is where the player performance evaluation comes 
into play. It would not make sense for a team to sign a player for a ten year, ten million dollar contract 
unless it is believed that player will generate revenues for the length of the contract. This is where the 
player evaluation methods come into light because they can give managers the insight into performance 
that may be needed to judge a contract value. 
Any attempt at an economic analysis of the professional team sports industry requires an 
understanding of the unique framework. The firms or "clubs" that are of major league quality include 
those from the sports of baseball, football, basketball, and hockey. The members of each of these teams 
and leagues are bound by a series of formal agreements dealing with the economic, sporting, and other 
aspects of their relationships. Very few professional sports clubs are publicly held corporations. 
Ownership is held, for the most part, in the hands of private individuals, families, or closely held 
corporations, all of which are extremely reluctant to reveal the facts of their economic and financial 
operations (Demmert 1973). This fact makes it difficult to evaluate teams on their true value and 
financial status, because most of the financial information is not released. In some cases, there have 
been times when financial statements were forced to be released through subpoenas from the courts, but 
those times are still few and far between. 
Even though the majority of these teams are not publicly held, that does not mean that they are 
not operated as a business. The private individuals or families are still in the business of sports team 
ownership to make money, hence increasing value. A professional sports team is a business, plain and 
simple, no matter who owns it, public or private. As does each business, sports teams must have 
strategies in place for their operations. The underlying assumption of business finance is that each 
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person operates in his or her own self-interest. Ultimately, the management of the business wants to 
make money, not lose money. Is the same principle true for baseball owners? Does a manager of a 
team only make decisions that will benefit themselves? Does a player on the field only make plays that 
will benefit themselves? Though the person believes at the time that their decision will be personally 
beneficial, the end output ultimately becomes a product of the collective effort of the entire team's 
performance. 
There are thirty-five main metropolitan areas of the United States, and each of these areas has 
at least one professional club and twenty of these cities have at least three professional teams. This 
means that the professional sport industry is very centralized. The industry thrives on the city where 
they are located, and are determinant on that city for fans, locations, and sometimes even financing. 
Economic Value Added 
Another key theory useful to businesses and sport franchise managers is called the "real key to 
creating wealth," or the Economic Value Added. The Economic Value Added (EVA) idea is one that swept 
the business world in the early 1990s (Tully 1993). This measure allows for the looking at of a business 
organization and the determination almost immediately of whether or not that company was becoming 
more valuable or less. What exactly is EVA? Simply stated, 
"EVA is a way of measuring an operation's real profitability. What makes it so revealing 
is that it takes into account a factor no conventional measure includes: the total cost of 
an operations capital. The capital is all the money that is tied up in such things as heavy 
equipment, real estate, computers, and other stuff that is expected to be productive for a 
while after it has been purchased, plus so called working capital, mainly cash, 
inventories, and receivables" (Tully 1993). 
What does this statistic mean for baseball? Evaluation using the EVA method would allow for a 
team to include all of their capital, as stated in the definition. If the ballpark is privately owned, it is 
included. All of the money that is tied up in paying for the stadium, conceSSions, computers, equipment, 
and so forth would be included in the value of the team. Even down to contracts or "purchases" of 
players would be able to be included because of the productivity that they are expected to bring after the 
initial purchase. The power of the economic value added concept comes from the insights that it is 
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impossible to know if a company is creating value until the true cost of capital is applied to all the capital 
employed. 
To figure EVA, there are two questions that must be asked. First, what is the true cost of capital 
and second, how much capital is tied up in the operation? The first question is difficult to answer without 
also looking at question two. To calculate the true cost of capital for the organization, it must also be 
known how much capital is tied up in the organization. For question number two, most people would 
assume that the capital tied up in the organization would stop at real estate, machines, vehicles and so 
forth. But supporters of the EVA theory include items such as research and development, employee 
training, basically any type of investment that is expected to payoff for years. Rather than calling these 
items expenses, EVA includes them as capital investments. This means that owners and managers of 
professional baseball teams can evaluate their salary "expenses" as a type of capital investment rather 
than just as money spent. For what they are paying a person now, they expect that they will reap the 
benefits of this money for multiple seasons, depending on the length of the contract. 
50, how is the value of a professional team determined? As mentioned before, value is the 
present value of future earnings or incomes, and incomes are found by taking revenues minus costs. The 
simple thing to do would be to calculate values for each of these items and find the value of the team, 
but when financial records are not released, it becomes a more difficult task. Instead, the value part of 
the equation, as well as revenues and costs will each be discussed in their own upcoming sections. 
Team Valuations 
Much like the increases in professional baseball player salaries, there have also been dramatic 
increases in the valuation of professional baseball teams. One does not even have to look over the entire 
course of hiStory of the MLB, rather just over the past decade to see these changes. Following along 
with the same ideas as sharing television network revenues, teams in smaller market areas are faced 
with the difficulty of trying to keep up with the teams in the larger market areas. Market size is positively 
correlated with average salaries, since big team markets can afford to pay more, because of their greater 
gate receipts and local broadcast revenues (5taudohar 1997). As the revenue potentials of the large and 
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small markets continue to diverge, the teams in large cities routinely swallow up the games choicest free 
agents while small market clubs are left developing the talent and then giving it away (Fitzel 1999). 
To begin this assessment, the following is a pie chart displaying the 1998 Major League Baseball 
revenues. This national pastime generated an astounding $2.7 billion in revenues during the season. 
The main sources were ticket sales and suite rentals for $1.1 billion, broadcasting for $917 million, and 
food and merchandise sales at $329 million. 
Table One: Breakdown of the 1998 Major League Baseball Revenues 
Broadcasting, 34% 
Tickets and Suites, 
41% 
Food and 
fv'Ierchandising, 12% 
I '-- "-- Other, 6% 
A""rtising and 
Sponsorship, 7% 
Source: Badenhausen, Kurt and William Sicheri (1999). "Baseball Games."~. May 31: 112-117. 
In 1999, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig had a plan to have revenue rich teams like the New York 
Yankees and Cleveland Indians share more of their wealth with the poorer teams. His argument was that 
the World Champion Yankees had revenues of $176 million, at that point the most of any team in sports, 
which equaled more than the combined revenue of the Montreal Expos, Minnesota Twins, and Milwaukee 
Brewers. These disparities "threaten the competitive balance," Selig said (Badenhausen 1999). 
As of 1999, Major League Baseball was dividing its national broadcasting and licensing revenues 
equally among the thirty teams. The top thirteen revenue-generating teams contributed $100 million to 
the fifteen teams with the lowest revenues. The argument now is that teams such as Montreal Expos 
and Oakland Athletics are posting profits, while teams such as New York Mets and Los Angeles Dodgers 
were losing money, mostly due to revenue sharing. 
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The following chart is a breakdown of the 1999 value of three selected MLB teams, in addition to 
a column showing the league averages. The three chosen teams are the New York Yankees, Chicago 
Cubs, and Montreal Expos. It is felt that these three teams are a valid sample of all professional teams. 
The New York Yankees come from a very large market area, and have to deal with competition in their 
own city. The Chicago Cubs come from a medium to large sized market, but have a tremendous 
following. The Montreal Expos represent small market teams that are forced to compete with groups of 
teams such as the Yankees and Cubs. For 1999, the New York Yankees held in first sport in terms of 
overall value, the Cubs occupied number fourteen, and the Montreal Expos were in first place. The two 
figures are for current value of the team and their current revenues, both in millions of dollars. As seen, 
the Cubs were quite a distance from the front-runner Yankees, but posted numbers very close to the MLB 
averages. 
Table Two: 1999 Major League Baseball Valuation (in millions) 
600 
soo 
400 
300 
200 
100 
a 
New York Yankees Chicago Cubs Montreal Expos League Averages 
Compiled from: Badenhausen, Kurt and William Sicheri (1999). "Baseball Games.' ~. May 31: 112-117. 
!-eurrent' 
Value ! 
• Qment 
! ___ ~venuel 
When baseball hit a new millennium, many of the opinions of those involved in the sport business 
also changed with the changing of the calendar. Feeling that baseball was just beginning to recover from 
the strike that cancelled the 1994 World Series, there was a buzz about that the same thing would 
happen in 2001 with the renewal of the collective bargaining agreement (Ozanian 2000). Following along 
with the article published a year before, the management of the thirty professional baseball teams were 
still barking at the idea of revenue sharing. As of 2000, many of the team managers had agreed to 
revenue sharing under one condition, salary caps. With the current collective bargaining agreement 
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between owners and player set to expire after the 2000 season, with an option to extend the contract 
through the 2001 season, it was the perfect time for the owners to attempt to put their idea of salary 
caps into motion. As of 1999, the thirty professional baseball teams had on average $0.32 of debt 
stacked against each dollar of enterprise value, defined as the value of the team without deduction for 
debt other than stadium debt. In 2000, that figure had risen to $0.43 per enterprise dollar. Many Major 
League teams, at this point, had more debt on the balance sheet than annual revenues. 
According to the 2000 Forbes magazine valuation article, even though many of the team owners 
wanted to argue for a salary cap in baseball for the continuation of revenue sharing, analysts at Forbes 
did not see another lockout happening. A lockout would have cut off badly needed revenues to cover the 
mountains of debt and long-term deferred contracts. As of that point, Forbes saw revenue sharing 
continuing with or without the introduction of a salary cap (Ozanian 2000). 
The following table is a break down of 2000 revenues and values for the same three selected 
MLB teams. For 2000, the Yankees held onto the first slot with a growing margin over the number two 
Atlanta Braves, the Cubs occupied number thirteen, and the Montreal Expos remained in last place. 
Table Three: 2000 Major League Baseball Valuation (in millions) 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
o 
New York Yankees Chicago Cubs Montreal Expos 
Source: Ozanian, Michael (2000). "Too Much to lose" Forbes. June 12: pp96. 
League Al.erages 
,.Oment 
Value 
.o.ment 
Revenue 
In 2001, many of the teams turned from the argument of revenue sharing to that securing of 
mega television contracts and deals, so needless to say the argument of salary caps fell to the wayside. 
At this point, it was those teams that commanded the richest local television contracts that had the most 
money to attract the best players. Those players in turn, continue to drive revenues upwards. Television 
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ruled the day, and baseball's richest teams were those with the most lucrative cable and broadcasting 
deals. The importance of local television revenue to a baseball team cannot be overstated. Since 
national broadcasting rights and revenues are divided equally among the league's thirty teams, $11.5 
million per team in 1999, teams can increase their individual revenues by securing their own local 
contracts (Ozanian 2001). 
The following chart is a breakdown of the 2001 value of the same three selected MLB teams. For 
2001, the Yankees once again still remained in the first slot with a gaping margin over the number two 
New York Mets, and an increasing distance from the league averages. The Cubs dropped to number 
fourteen despite an increase in their value and revenues, and the Montreal Expos remained in last place. 
Table Four: 2001 Major League Baseball Valuation (in millions) 
700 
600 
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400 
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100 
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New York Yankees Chicago Cubs Montreal Expos League A\A9rages 
Source: Ozanian, Michael, and Kurt Badenhausen (2001). 'cable Guy.' f21:bn. April 16: ppl46. 
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Finally, for the season ending in 2002, there were still many more changes to the ideas of the 
baseball owners. This season was that of big sales and purchases, led by the sale of the Florida Marlins 
for over $700 million, more than twice the previous record sales price. It is still a battle of the teams 
with the richest television deals. Some of the teams that are worth the most, including the New York 
Yankees, Los Angeles Dodgers, Boston Red Sox, and Atlanta Braves, either own their own cable networks 
or are owned by some kind of a media company that has ties to television (Badenhausen 2002). 
The following chart is a breakdown of the 2002 values of selected MLB teams. For 2002 the 
Yankees were still the front-runners, the Cubs remained in number fourteen despite growth and the 
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Montreal Expos were still in last place. The two figures for current value and current revenues are still 
increasing for all three teams. 
Table Five: 2002 Major League Baseball Valuation (in millions) 
BOO 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
o 
New Yorl< Yankees Chicago Cubs Montreal Expos League Averages 
r" OJrreni-
Value 
• a..urent ! 
__ Revenu~ 
Source: Badenhausen, Kurt, Cecily Fluke, Lesley Kump, and Michael K. Ozanian (2002). "Double Play." ~. AprillS: PP92. 
In addition to showing individual charts for team valuation over the past four seasons, the data 
for each team over each of the four seasons is also displayed in the following line chart. In this chart, 
the current value of each team can be seen over the past four years, in relation to the league average. 
The rate at which the Yankees increased their current worth is much higher than that of the Cubs or of 
the Expos. The league average is also displayed on the chart for comparison with the three teams. 
Table Six: MLB Values 1999-2002 Seasons (in millions) 
BOO 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
1999 2000 2001 
Source: Compiled from four previously cited charts displaying team values. 
2002 
~::-Yank •• S. -~-
____ Cubs 
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I_~_~~ague ':--.erage 
In addition to showing the chart for current team value over the past four seasons, the following 
line chart displays the reported revenue of each team over the past four seasons. Like the table above, 
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the changes in the value over the past four seasons for the three selected teams in addition to the league 
averages can be seen and the changes noticed. As expected, the Yankees have a much higher reported 
revenue amounts than the other teams, and blow the league average out of the water. 
Table Seven: MLB Revenues 1999-2002 Seasons (in millions) 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
o 
1999 2000 2001 
Compiled from four previously cited Forbes articles displaying team revenues by season. 
2002 
~. - Yankees 
I-4-CUbS 
I .,.-- Expos 
I -----*-- League A wrage 
At the beginning of each season, Forbes magazine releases their estimated rankings for the thirty 
professional baseball teams according to their team estimated team value. The table, which will follow 
this discussion, is a compilation of those articles over the past four seasons. Starting with the 1999 
season values and ranking of the teams according to those values and then showing the values for each 
of the other three seasons, it is easy to see how each team has increased in value. 
At the time of the writing of this thesis, the values for the 2003 season had not been released by 
Forbes magazine. The calculations for the estimated value for the 2003 season were made using the 
data from the 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 seasons. The value, as well as the possible rankings, was 
both calculated. Following the table of the estimated values for the 2003 season is a table displaying the 
hypothetical situation of predicting the 2002 values. Imagine that it was before the 2002 season started, 
the only information available was from the three previous seasons, and the values were estimated and 
then the actual data released by Forbes magazine is shown in comparison with the estimates. 
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To begin finding the estimated 2003 value, the average percent change must be calculated for 
each team over the past four seasons. To accomplish this task the following formula was used: 
Average % = 
Change 
(2000 Value - 1999 Value) (2001 Value - 2000 Value) (2002 Value - 2001 Value) 
--------------------------------" -------------------------------" -------------------------------- / 3 
1999 Value 2000 Value 2001 Value 
To find the percent change between the 1999 and 2000 season, take the difference between the two 
amounts and divine by the beginning value. The same is done for the changes between the 2000 and 
2001 seasons as well as the 2001 and 2002 seasons. The three changes between the seasons are 
summed and then divided by three to find an average for the period from 1999 through 2002. 
For example, the Yankees Average Percent Change would be found by taking the change from 
1999 season, ($548 - $491}/$491, adding it to the change from the 2000 season, ($635 - $548}/$548, 
and adding the change from the 2001 season, ($730 - $635}/$635. After the addition of these three 
items together, the entire total is divided by three as an estimation of the average percent change. 
The next task is finding the estimated value for the 2003 season using this average percent 
change. The formula is much shorter and much easier to understand: 
Estimated 2003 Value = (2002 Value x Average Percent Change) " 2002 Value 
To use this formula, the first task is to find what the predicted growth will be, taking the value from 2002 
and finding the additional value to be added on. For example, the New York Yankees value in 2002 as 
$730 million. This figure is multiplied by the average percent change of 14.15%, giving a value of 
$103.28 million. The original value, $730 million, added to the change of $103.28 million, allows for the 
estimation of $833.28 million as the Yankees 2003 value. The following table shows the estimated value 
for all of the thirty professional teams. 
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Table Eight: Estimated 2003 Team Values (Dollar Amounts in Millions) 
Team Rankings Average Estimated 
Based on 2002 1999 Rank 2000 2001 2002 0/0 2003 Rank 
Standings Change Value 
New York Yankees $491 1 ~548 ~635 $730 14.15% 1$833.28 1 
New York Mets t249 10 $314 1$454 t482 25.62% 1$605.48 2 
Los Angeles Dodgers $270 8 $325 1$381 $435 17.26% 1$510.07 3 
Boston Red Sox 256 9 284 339 426 18.66% 1$505.47 4 
Atlanta Braves $357 3 $388 $407 $424 5.92% $449.10 5 
Seattle Mariners !$236 12 $290 $332 $373 16.57% 1$434.81 6 
Cleveland Indians '$359 2 ~364 ~372 $360 0.12% $360.44 10 
Texas Ranqers $281 7 $294 $342 $356 8.35% 1$385.72 8 
San Francisco Giants $213 15 $237 $333 $355 19.46% 1$424.08 7 
Colorado Rockies 311 5 305 334 347 3.82% 1$360.27 11 
Houston Astros $239 11 $280 $318 $337 12.23% 1$378.23 9 
Baltimore Orioles $351 4 ~347 ~335 $319 -3.12% 1$309.03 14 
rhicaqo Cubs 224 14 t242 1$247 287 8.77% 1$312.16 13 
Arizona Diamondbacks $291 6 $268 1$245 $280 -0.73% 1$277.95 17 
St. Louis cardinals 205 16 219 1$243 271 9.77% 1$297.48 15 
Detroit Tiqers $152 24 $200 1$290 $262 22.31% 1$320.45 12 
Pittsburgh Pirates $145 26 $161 1$211 1$242 18.93% 1$287.80 16 
Milwaukee Brewers 155 22 167 209 238 15.59% 1$275.10 18 
Philadelphia Phillies $145 25 $150 $158 $231 18.33% 1$273.34 19 
Chicago White Sox $178 19 $166 $213 $223 8.76% 1$242.52 20 
San Dieqo Padres 205 17 $197 t176 207 1.02% 1$209.11 22 
rincinnati Reds $163 20 $175 $187 $204 7.77% 1$219.85 21 
Anaheim AnQels 195 18 195 198 195 0.01% 1$195.02 23 
Toronto Blue Jays $162 21 $162 $161 $182 4.14% 1$189.54 24 
Oakland Athletics $125 27 $137 $149 $157 7.91% 1$169.42 26 
Kansas City Royals 96 28 t122 1$138 152 16.78% 1$177.51 25 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays $225 13 $163 1$150 $142 -13.62% 1$122.66 29 
Florida Marlins $153 23 $125 1$128 $137 -2.96% 1$132.95 28 
Minnesota Twins 89 29 91 1$99 127 13.11% 1$143.65 27 
Montreal Expos ~84 30 89 1$92 1$108 8.90% 1$117.62 30 
Source. Compiled from four-mentioned Forbes artlde detailing the value of the teams by season. 
As mentioned above at the time of completion, the values for 2003 still had not been released for 
the 2003 season. To test and show that these formulas do work, the 2002 season will be tested 
hypothetically. The conditions for this table are that the 2002 season is just beginning, and that the 
values will be estimated off of the 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 seasons. The same formulas described 
above were used to calculate this information. 
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Table Nine: Estimated 2002 Team Values (Dollar Amounts in Millions) 
Team Rankings Change Estimated Actual Differenc 
Based on 2002 From 1999 2000 2001 Average 0/0 2002 2002 e 
Standings 1998 Change Value Value 
New York Yankees 36% 1$491 1$548 $635 21.16% $769.38 $730 $39.38 
New York Mets 29% 1$249 $314 $454 33.23% $604.86 1$482 $122.86 
Atlanta Braves 19% 1$357 ,$388 ,$407 10.86% ~451.20 $424 $27.20 
los Anqeles Dodqers 14% $270 1$325 1$381 17.20% $446.53 $435 il1.53 
Cleveland Indians 12% 1$359 1$364 '$372 5.20% $391.33 ~360 $31.33 
Texas Rangers 11% 1$281 $294 $342 10.65% $378.43 1$356 $22.43 
Boston Red Sox 12% 1$256 $284 $339 14.10% 386.80 1$426 $39.20) 
Baltimore Orioles 9% 1$351 $347 $335 1.47% $339.92 1$319 $20.92 
Colorado Rockies 3% !$311 $305 $334 3.53% $345.78 1$347 $1.22) 
San Francisco Giants 13% 1$213 '$237 $333 21.59% $404.90 1$355 49.90 
Seattle Mariners -6% 1$236 $290 $332 10.45% $366.71 1$373 ($6.29) 
Houston Astros 26% 1$239 $280 $318 18.91% $378.13 1$337 $41.13 
Detroit Tigers 11% 1$152 $200 ~290 29.19% ~374.66 1$262 ~112.66 
Chicaqo Cubs 10% '$224 $242 ~247 6.70% 263.55 1$287 ($23.45) 
Arizona Diamondbacks NA $291 $268 $245 -8.24% $224.80 1$280 $55.20) 
St. Louis Cardinals 18% ,$205 $219 $243 11.93% $271.99 1$271 $0.99 
Chicago White Sox -17% 1$178 $166 213 1.52% ~216.25 1$223 ($6.75) 
Pittsburqh Pirates 9% !$145 $161 $211 17.03% $246.93 1$242 $4.93 
Milwaukee Brewers 22% $155 $167 $209 18.30% $247.24 1$238 $9.24 
~naheim Angels 24% $195 $195 $198 8.51% $214.86 1$195 $19.86 
Cincinnati Reds 20% }163 ~175 ~187 11.41% ~208.33 1$204 ~4.33 
San Dieqo Padres 27% $205 197 ~176 4.15% 183.30 1$207 $23.70) 
[Toronto Blue Jays 15% 1$162 $162 $161 4.79% $168.72 1$182 ($13.28) 
Philadelphia Phillies 11% 1$145 $150 $158 6.59% $168.42 1$231 $62.58) 
rrampa Bay_Devil Rays NA ~225 $163 ~150 -17.77% ~123.35 1$142 $18.65) 
Oakland Athletics 6% $125 $137 $149 8.12% 161.10 1$157 4.10 
Kansas City Royals -11% $96 $122 $138 9.73% $151.43 1$152 ($0.57) 
Florida Marlins -4% $153 $125 $128 -6.63% 1$119.51 1$137 $17.49) 
Minnesota Twins -5% 89 91 99 2.01% IilOO.99 1$127 [126.01) 
Montreal Expos -4% '$84 $89 $92 1.77% 1$93.63 1$108 $14.37) 
As seen from the previous table, this method of estimation proves to be close for some teams 
and quite far off for some other teams. When adding the overall changes per team together, the 
estimated value was only $7.13 million off from the actual values of the teams. Exactly fifteen teams are 
estimated over and fifteen teams are estimated under their current value. Some estimations came as 
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close as $99,000 and some were as far off as $122 million. In any case, showing the estimated values 
for the 2002 season proves that this is a good method to use for the estimation of the 2003 values and 
should be comparable to the actual data when it is released. 
PLAYER SALARIES - AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS 
Trends in Player Salaries 
The Reasons behind the Trends 
Historically, baseball players were not highly paid, but this fact has dramatically changed in 
modern times. For example, in 1918 "Shoeless Joe" Jackson, a ten year veteran of professional baseball, 
held the second highest lifetime batting average in the history of baseball, hitting .354. His 1919 salary 
increased to $6,000, a hefty sum for the time, but only equivalent to $46,000 in 1999 dollars, which did 
not even make the league minimum (Quirk 1997). Another example, while on the 1927 New York 
Yankees team, baseball legend Babe Ruth was paid an unheard of sum of $80,000. The other members 
of this team, held to be the best baseball team ever, made much less, ranging from $17,500 down to 
$7,000. Babe Ruth's salary, a fantastic sum in those days, when evaluated now, would be worth 
approximately $750,000 in 1996 dollars, or a measly fourteen percent of what Yankee right fielder Paul 
O'Neil made in 1996 (Staudohar 1996). It is reported that when Babe Ruth was offered $80,000 to play 
for the Yankees, many people were shocked at the fact that he was being paid more than President 
Herbert Hoover, who was only making $75,000. Ruth was asked if he deserved to be paid more than the 
president and is said to have replied, "Why not? I had a better year than he did" (Staudohar, 1997). 
Still even more amazing is the fact that at the beginning of the 1900s, the average ball player 
made around $5,100 per year, which was about eight times what the average manufacturing worker 
pulled in. Currently, the average ball player now makes more than two million dollars per year, forty-two 
times the salary of the average manufacturing worker (Dukcevich 2002). The following is a pictorial 
illustration of the changes in average manufacturing worker salary, the average baseball player salary, 
and the highest paid baseball player salary over the course of the past century. 
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Table Ten: What They Made 
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Players Association, USA Today, National Baseball Hall of Fame, USNews, W.G. Nicholson and Roger Noll. 
The average manufacturing worker salary, over the past century, has not even passed the 
$100,000 per year mark. The average baseball player salary crossed that barrier more than thirty years 
ago, and the highest paid baseball player crossed that line ninety years ago. Looking at the lines, the 
average manufacturing worker salary has increased at a relatively equal pace, probably to account for 
increases in minimum wages. Looking at the average baseball player salary and highest-paid baseball 
player salary, there are quick jumps and steep increases. 
What accounts for this dramatic increase in the salaries of professional baseball players? There 
have been major changes in the structure of salaries, mainly in recent history, because of a strong 
bargaining position held by the players. The opposite was true at the beginning of the century; the 
players exercised little bargaining power and did not make big money. Many of the early players 
attempted to form player unions to fights against the low salaries, the reserve clause of player contracts, 
and earn themselves more power in the decisions facing the league. 
The most significant development in the increases of player salaries was the formations of the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) in 19S2 by Marvin Miller. Though he was a former 
Steelworkers Union official, he secured free agency and salary arbitration for the current players 
(Staudohar 1997). Before the establishment of free agency, a player had no bargaining leverage with 
their club. The team that owned the player has the exclusive right to re-sign that player. Now, under 
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free agency, players with six years of major league experience have the option to be able to sign with 
other teams. Because of this option, various teams all bid for the player, driving up the amount of the 
salary that will be paid. 
The second major benefit for players secured by the MLBPA was salary arbitration. After a player 
has served about 2.7 years in the majors, he can have his salary arbitrated if a club will not come to 
terms. Arbitration results in a higher salary because an arbitrator awards compensation attuned to a 
player's worth, rather than what his team would be willing to pay in a closed market (Staudohar 1997). 
This leads to increased salaries because players are more likely to estimate their value at a higher 
amount than what the owners would. Because the decision has to be made between the dollar amount 
that the player submits, which is usually higher than the actual value, versus the amount that the owners 
have to turn in, which is historically closer to the actual value or a little bit lower, the salaries continue to 
be driven up. Most times the arbitrator's side with the players, feeling that the dollar amount submitted 
by the owners is less than what would be paid in an open market. 
In addition to free agency and salary arbitration, television revenues also provide fuel for the 
escalating player salaries. The most important are network and cable television contracts. Because of 
the 1996 collective bargaining agreement, national broadcasting revenues are now shared among the 
thirty professional teams. Television revenues have been on the rise for the past decade, which filters 
down to increases in player salaries. Local television revenues are not shared though, which means 
teams in big market areas are benefiting more than those teams in the smaller market areas. For 
example, the New York Yankees are in a large market area, all of New York and the surrounding areas. 
Though they do have another professional team in the same area, they still have their own contracts with 
the local televiSion networks, which increases the revenues of the team and in turn the salaries of the 
professional players. Another team, such as the Montreal Expos, does not have a large market area or a 
large amount of television coverage. Therefore, the dollar amount of revenues for that team would not 
equal those of the Yankees, leading to the differences in value. 
Many people feel that baseball players are celebrities of American culture because of the 
entertainment that they bring to large audiences. It is not uncommon for some entertainment, 
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specifically movie stars, to get paid anywhere from ten to twenty-five million dollars for one picture 
(Staudohar 1997). Many corporate executives of nationwide leading companies are also receiving 
salaries rivaling entertainment stars and professional baseball players. Some people feel that it is 
misleading to compare the salaries of professional baseball players to that of industrial America because 
baseball is part of the entertainment business. Others feel that industrial America provides the backbone 
for the economy and should be considered as a significant salary comparison with that of professional 
baseball players. The argument is who should get paid more, those that bring entertainment to large 
audiences on nights and weekends or those that provide the backbone of the American economic system. 
The same rules do not apply for industrial America, professional baseball players, and corporate America; 
baseball players are a type of a "one of a kind artist" because of their star performer capabilities. When 
looked at in this perspective, perhaps some baseball players are actually underpaid, considering the 
revenue they bring to their team (Staudohar 1997). 
The Trends of Major League Baseball 
To have a better understanding of the trends in Major League Baseball salaries, it is imperative 
that some groundwork definitions are explained. The biggest interest in the trends is the widening gap 
between the minimum, average, median, and top salaries. Minimum salary is the lowest amount that a 
professional player can be paid to play baseball. The average salary is self-explanatory, the overall sum 
of all of the salaries divided equally between each of the players. Median salary refers to the level at 
which half of the players earned more and half earned less. The top salary is what the highest paid 
professional baseball player received for that season. 
Average salaries began their sharp increase around 1976, at the same time when the benefits of 
free agency became available to the players (Staudohar 1997). Until the early 1970s, an owner could 
pay a player whatever he deemed appropriate sell the players of his team without their consent, limited 
only by a maximum twenty percent pay cut when moving to a new team. This left the player with two 
choices: do what the owner said or offered or quit playing baseball (Sheehan 1996). From 1970 through 
1975, the last five years before free agency took effect, MLB player salaries increased by an average of 
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8.8 percent, while inflation was averaging 6.5 percent, meaning that real salaries after inflation were 
rising at 2.3 percent per year. In the five years following the advent of free agency, salaries increased on 
the average of 29.7 percent per year, while inflation was averaging only 9.8 percent. This left the players 
with a gain of almost twenty percent per year (Sheehan 1996). Sheehan feels that these salary increases 
that accompanied free agency suggest that the players were catching up to "where they would have 
been all along if their salaries had been set by a free market" (1996). The increases in average and 
median salaries can be seen in Table Two, as well as the widening gap between these two variables. 
Table Eleven: Major League Baseball Salaries, Annual Averages, 1970-1980 
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Major League Baseball Players Association and Major League Baseball. 
With the speed that baseball salaries increased in the late 1970s, the labor costs aSSOCiated with 
the spending of millions on free agents became a great concern to the owners. Once this surge was 
over, salary growth slowed substantially, mainly due to owner collusion in bidding on free agents to slow 
the salary escalation. Collusion, as defined by Webster's Dictionary, means a "secret agreement or 
cooperation especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose" (Collusion 2000). To attempt slow the growth, 
the owners decided that something had to be done to substantially reduce the opportunity for players to 
sell their services to the highest bidder. If there was no bidding for free agents, players would have to 
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take what their old club was willing to offer, which of course was far less than what the amount would be 
on the open market. 
In 1985, there were sixty-two players that qualified for free agency. At the deadline for the 
season, fifty-seven of these players had re-signed with their old teams. There was some interest 
expressed in some free agents by other clubs, but the offers were relatively low (Staudohar 1996). From 
1986 to 1989 players' salaries increased by 6.6 percent and inflation averages 4.2 percent leaving players 
a 2.4 percent increase in their salaries. This rivaled the amount of increase before free agency (Sheehan, 
1996). In response to what appeared to be a collUSive arrangement among the owners, the Major 
League Baseball Players Association filed grievances over this collusion, which was prohibited by the 
collective bargaining agreement, and the owners would up having to pay the affected players about $280 
million in lost wages (Staudohar 1997). 
The 1990s proved to be a roller coaster decade for the amounts of player salaries. From 1990 
through 1992, player salaries escalated again due to a new television contract that dramatically increased 
the revenue of MLB. Salaries increased 42.5 percent in 1991, almost as rapidly as in 1977, the first year 
of free agency, where salaries increased by 47.7 percent. The increase in the amount of revenues led to 
higher franchise values, and led some owners to bid more aggressively for free agents. The goal of each 
time was to win the World Series, and these additional television contracts gave each owner almost ten 
million dollars to go out and buy the team to win the title (Sheehan 1996). Salaries immediately jumped 
with the introduction of these televiSion contracts and continued to increase as arbitration awards were 
applied to free agent signings and player contracts were negotiated before the televiSion deal came up 
for renewal. 
The rate of salary increase slowed during the 1993 through 1996 period. These changes were to 
be expected because of the decline in national media money and other rippling effects leading up to, 
during, and after the 1994-1995 players strike. The cancellation of many games throughout the season 
and the cancellation of the World Series in 1994 led to massive amounts of loss revenues for MLB, about 
one billion over a three-year period (Staudohar 1997). 
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The Future of Current Major League Baseball Salaries 
For many years, the median salaries were roughly two-thirds as high as average salaries, but 
recent averages have been two to four times higher than the medians. The reason for this is that 
professional baseball clubs are beginning to sign a small number of very high priced free agents, meaning 
that there is less left over to pay the rest of the players. For example, during the 1994 season, only 
twelve percent of the players accounted for nearly fifty-four percent of the payrolls. In a typical club, 
twenty percent of the players make eighty percent of the money (Staudohar 1997). 
In became common in the 1990s for clubs to replace high salaried fringe players with younger 
players from the farm system. The number of rookies also increased significantly during this time. This 
is referred to as a "Hollywood" effect of the work force (Staudohar 1997). The stars are the ones who 
are always making the big bucks; the exceptionally talented players will usually receive the biggest share 
of the pie. One of the main reasons that unions have arisen in sports is to bolster the economic fortunes 
of the little guys, the marginal players, the equipment operators, and so forth. Mainly for the marginal 
players of professional baseball, it is very easy to replace them with rookies or less talented players to 
make room in the payroll to bring in the "stars" or more talented players. 
The collective bargaining agreement of 1996 also had played a large role in the determination of 
salaries. The biggest change in the new agreement was the adoption of a lUXUry tax. Teams that spent 
over a certain amount in payrolls, $51 million in 1997, were taxed at a rate of thirty-five percent in the 
amount of the payroll exceeding the cap figure. In 1998 the cap rose to $55 million, and in 1999 was 
raised to $58.9 million with only a thirty-four percent tax on the amount above the cap. The lUXUry tax 
was not in effect in 2000. The players also had the option to extend the contract to six years, through 
2001, which would have meant that the lUXUry tax would not have been in effect that year either. Also, 
under this agreement, players were required to pay a two and a half percent tax on their individual 
salaries, which was contributed to the revenue-sharing pool. The revenue-sharing agreement was 
expected to have redirected about seventy million dollars to thirteen small market teams, so that they 
could more vigorously compete for high quality players. 
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Due to the collective bargaining agreement of 1996, the overall fortunes of both owners and 
players were enhanced by the settlement. The dollar amount of sponsorship deals increased, the 
national television agreements have been greatly improved, and a number of attractive new stadiums 
have been built or are on the way. Two new teams were added to the rosters, the Arizona 
Diamondbacks and Tampa Bay Devil Rays, in 1998. Fans have increased interest in the outcomes of the 
league now that there is inter league play that started in 1997. 
Since the 1994 season, the average salaries have been almost level and the median salaries 
dropped significantly. It is believed that once again, salaries should start to increase, but not nearly at 
the pace that baseball players have seen in the past. The declining trends should be reversed at the 
economics of the game improve and the market forces translate into higher salaries, especially higher 
average. It is expected though, that the median salary as a percent of the average will remain low 
because owners will continue to pay very high salaries to a few exceptionally talented players, wile 
economizing by paying marginal players less. It is unlikely that this fact will ever change, especially 
because all teams want to sign the players that will put fans in the stands and help them win. This 
results in the spending of higher amounts of money to get players like Alex Rodriquez or Derek Jeter. 
These are the people that fans want to see, and owners are willing to spend the money to get them to 
the fans. 
Salaries of Professional Players 
In order to fully understand the trends of salaries of professional baseball players, it is important 
to look at some dollar figures. As mentioned above, average salary is the dollar amount that each player 
would be paid if the total salary were divided equally among the entire team. The median salary is the 
dollar amount at which half of the team earned more and half of the team earned less. For the 2002 
season, the following two tables display the total payrolls, average salaries, and median salaries of the 
National League and American League, respectively. 
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Table Twelve: 2002 National League Salaries 
Total Payroll Average Salary Median Salary 
Arizona Diamondbacks $102,819,999 $3,115,757 $2,000,000 
Atlanta Braves $93,470,367 $3,015,173 $600,000 
Chicago Cubs $75,690,833 $2,703,244 $1,462,500 
Cincinnati Reds $45,050,390 $1,501,679 $500,000 
Colorado Rockies $56,851,043 $2,105,594 $600,000 
Florida Marlins $41,979,917 $1,499,282 $737,500 
Houston Astros $63,448,417 $2,349,941 $500,000 
Los Angeles Dodgers $94,850,953 $3,648,116 $1,950,000 
Milwaukee Brewers $50,287,833 $1,734,063 $1,100,000 
Montreal Expos $38,670,500 $1,381,089 $345,000 
New York Mets $94,633,593 $3,639,753 $2,107,500 
Philadelphia Phillies $57,954,999 $2,069,821 $675,000 
Pittsburgh Pirates $42,323,599 $1,459,434 $625,000 
St. Louis Cardinals $74,660,875 $2,871,572 $2,125,000 
San Diego Padres $41,425,000 $1,428,448 $350,000 
San Francisco Giants $78,299,835 $2,899,993 $1,750,000 
Source. USA Today 2002 NL Salanes (2002). USA Today [webSite onhne]. Accessed March 15, 2003. April 5, 
2002. Available Online: http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/salary/usat-2002nl.htoo. Internet. 
Table Thirteen: 2002 American League Salaries 
Total Payroll Average Salary Median Salary 
l4naheim Angels $61,721,667 $2,204,345 $450,000 
Baltimore Oriels $60,493,487 $1,890,421 $300,000 
Boston Red Sox $108,336,060 $3,612,202 $2,287,500 
Chicago White Sox $57,052,833 $2,113,067 $575,000 
Cleveland Indians $78,909,449 $2,630,314 $1,650,000 
Detroit Tigers $55,048,000 $1,966,000 $1,000,000 
Kansas City Royals $47,257,000 $1,629,551 $800,000 
Minnesota Twins $40,225,000 $1,547,115 $475,000 
New York Yankees $125,928,583 $4,342,364 $2,500,000 
Oakland Athletics $40,004,167 $1,481,635 $812,500 
Seattle Mariners $80,262,668 $3,211,306 $3,333,333 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays $34,380,000 $1,227,857 $267,500 
rr exas Rangers $105,726,122 $3,645,728 $2,000,000 
rroronto Blue Jays $76,684,333 $2,650,494 $1,650,000 
Source. USA Today 2002 AL Salanes (2002). USA Today [website online]. Accessed March 15, 2002. April 5, 
2002. Available Online: httD:llwww.usatoday.com/sDorts/baseball/sararv/usat-2002al.htm. Internet. 
Though both of these tables are informative in the respect that actual dollar amount values are 
assigned to each of the teams, it is believed that the following charts will better assist in showing the 
large variation of total salaries, average salaries, and median salaries among the thirty professional 
baseball teams. 
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The first table displays the total payroll by team for each of the thirty teams for the 2002 season. 
There are thirty-one columns total, one for each of the professional teams and the last column displays 
the average of all of the payrolls. The teams are listed alphabetically by their home city of play. The 
Yankees, a little more than half way through the chart, are easily seen to be the leaders in total payroll. 
This graph is a good way to show the growing distances between the teams. The higher marker teams, 
such as the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox, are way above the MLB average, while smaller 
market teams, such as the Minnesota Twins and Montreal Expos, are located below the MLB average. 
Table Fourteen: Total Payroll by Team for 2002 Season {in millions} 
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The next table shows the average salaries and the median salaries for the thirty professional 
baseball teams for the 2002 season. The teams are listed in the same order as the bar chart above. The 
blue bars in this table show the average salary, while the red bars show the median salary. This allows 
for a viewing of the differences between average and median salary per team for the 2002 season. 
Though the differences between these two variables is not that dramatiC when looking at one season 
alone, it still shows the varying amounts among the thirty professional teams. 
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Table Fifteen: 2002 Average and Median Salaries (in millions) 
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This next table shows the average salary and median salary increases over the course of the past 
thirty years for the Major League Baseball organization as a whole. There is no breakdown of teams here 
for two reasons. The first is the numerous amounts of relocations and additions that have taken place 
over the past thirty years. The second is for time and space constraints. This chart better displays the 
widening gap between the average and median salaries that has been the discussion of much of the 
previous part of this paper. This continues to drive home the fact that professional franchises are paying 
fewer players more money, meaning that there is less money left over for the rest of the team. Average 
salaries have risen at a much quicker pace because of this distortion of the 80-20 rule; twenty percent of 
a team's players are making a rough average of eighty percent of the total payroll. That means that the 
other eighty percent of the players are only making twenty percent of the payroll, which is why median 
salaries are not increasing as quickly as average salaries. The very steep increase at the end of the chart 
is to account for the lack of information for the years 1997-2001. The data jumps from 1996 to 2002 
without any of the intermediate data to show the relative increases. 
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Table Sixteen: Average and Median Salaries 
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Compiled From: Slaudohar, P. (1997), "Baseball's Changing Salary Structure." Comoensation and Working Conditions. Fall 1997. 
The table on the following page displays revenues versus salaries of the thirty professional 
baseball teams, as well as a row that shows the league averages. This states another point in the 
valuation equation. Looking at the difference between the revenues in column two and the salary 
expenses in column four, even without making the calculation, it is easy to see that the difference 
between these two figures would be less than what the current value is listed for the team. This is where 
the present value of future earnings is important. The current value is based on all of the capital tied up 
in the organization, as the EVA principle stated, which increases the current value for the season. 
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Table Seventeen: Revenues Verses Salaries 
Current Operating Salary 
Team Value' Revenues2 Income3 Expense' 
New York Yankees $730 $215 $18.7 $125.93 
New York Mets $482 $169 $14.3 $94.63 
Los Angeles Dodgers $435 $143 -$29.6 $94.85 
Boston Red Sox $426 $152 -$11.4 $108.37 
Atlanta Braves $424 $160 $9.5 $93.47 
Seattle Mariners ~73 ~j166 ~14.1 _$80.28 
Cleveland Indians $360 $150 -$3.6 $78.90 
Texas Rangers $356 $134 -$6.5 $105.73 
San Francisco Giants $355 ~142 $16.8 $78.30 
Colorado Rockies $347 $129 $6.7 $56.85 
Houston Astros $337 $125 $4.1 $63.45 
Baltimore Oriels $319 $133 $3.2 $60.49 
Chicago Cubs $287 $131 $7.9 $75.69 
Arizona Diamondbacks $280 ~27 :i3.9 ~102.82 
St. Louis Cardinals $271 $123 -$5.1 $74.66 
DetrOit Tigers $262 $114 $12.3 $55.05 
Pittsburgh Pirates $242 $108 $9.5 $42.32 
Milwaukee Brewers $238 $108 $18.8 $50.29 
Philadelphia Phillies $231 $94 $2.6 $57.95 
Chicago White Sox $223 $101 -$3.8 $57.05 
San Diego Padres $207 $92 $5.7 $41.43 
Cincinnati Reds $204 $87 $4.3 $45.05 
Anaheim Angels $195 $103 ~5.7 j61.72 
Toronto Blue Jays $182 $91 -$20.6 $76.86 
Oakland Athletics $157 $90 $6.8 $40.00 
Kansas City Royals $152 $85 $2.2 $47.26 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays $142 $92 -$6.1 $34.38 
Florida Marlins $137 _$81 $1.4 $41.98 
Minnesota Twins $127 $75 $3.6 $40.23 
Montreal Expos $108 $63 -$3.4 $38.67 
League Averages $286 $119 $2.5 $67.49 
. 123 , Compiled From. " (Ozanran 2002) and (USA Today NL and AL Salanes 2002) 
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MEASURING TEAM AND PLAYER PERFORMANCE 
Methods of Valuation 
As mentioned numerous times throughout this paper, the key to increasing the value of a sports 
franchise is to attempt to decrease the amount of salary expenses that teams are being forced to spend. 
When the time comes that a player qualifies for either salary arbitration or free agency, it would be useful 
for all parties involved if the performance of the player on the field could be evaluated and then reflected 
in the amount of salary that certain player was receiving. Though these are not the only methods out 
there to evaluate professional baseball player performance, these are the three that were found to be the 
most benefiCial for relations between salaries and performance. 
Forbes Total Production Number 
Even though the average current salary for professional baseball players is exceeding two million 
dollars, the players who make more than five million are still rare finds. Of the roughly 4S0 position 
players in the major leagues, only sixty-five players reached the rarified air for the 2002 season. To 
assess which of these players are earning their keep and deserving their pay, there is a statistic called the 
Forbes Total Production Number (FTPN) that can be calculated. To make this assessment, the ability to 
get on base is combined with the ability to hit for power. The formula for finding FTPN is as follows: 
Total bases + (0.75 x bases on balls) - (0.2 x strikeouts) 
FTPN = ----------------------------------------------------------------- x 1000 
(At bats + bases on balls) 
Source: Ackman, Dan. "Baseball's Best - And Best for the Buck" 
Total bases are the beginning point, considered the best of traditional statistics, and adjustments are 
made for bases on balls and strikeouts. Walks are included at a discount, because even though it is good 
to get a man on base, a walk does not always advance a lead runner as does a hit (Ackman 2002). 
Strikeouts are included at a penalty. The total of the numerator is divided by the total number of plate 
appearances, or at bats plus bases on balls, and then multiplied by one thousand. The result is the FTPN 
for one specified player. 
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Every true baseball fan remembers the 2001 season, where people were on the edges of their 
seats waiting to see who would pull ahead in the battle for the most home runs. In the end, Barry Bonds 
took a remarkable lead, ending up with 73 homers, compared to the 64 of Sammy Sosa. Once the 
Forbes Total Production Number was calculated for each player, Barry Bonds ended up with 804, over a 
hundred more points than Sammy Sosa. For the 2001 season, these are the players that are ranked as 
baseball ten's best according to their FTPN. 
Table Eighteen: Baseball's Ten Best for 2001 
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Source: Ackman, Oan (2002). 
Just seven out of these top ten players also rank in the top among the highest paid players in the 
game. Luis Gonzalez, an Arizona outfielder, has just recently emerged as a superstar. Todd Helton, 
quickly racking up the numbers, will be a hot bit when his free agency years roll around. And finally, St. 
Louis outfielder Albert Pujols and Houston outfielder Lance Berkman should both be expecting pay raises. 
Neither of these two men have reached the time reqUirement needed to qualify for salary arbitration or 
free agency but when their times comes, rest assured that their salary increases will reflect their 
performances (Ackman 2002). 
Once the FTPN is calculated, besides determining who are the best players, what else can be 
done? This statistic is very useful for calculating baseball's rich, but underpaid, the most overpaid stars, 
and the bargain ball players. How are these determinations made? Each of the players of Major League 
Baseball has his FTPN calculated, and then players are ranked in order, from highest to lowest. Another 
column is made for the player salary, and then the players are also ranked in order from highest to 
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lowest. The difference between salary rank and FTPN rank is known as the value differential. This is the 
number that is used to determine the classification of the player. 
Baseball's rich, but underpaid are those players who are the clear overachievers who perform at 
the very top levels, but are paid closer to the bottom of the top tier. For example, Todd Helton has been 
determined to be the most underpaid star. In his fifth full season, he does not have the full bargaining 
rights provided by free agency. He earned $5 million for the 2001 season, ranking him as the sixty-third 
highest salary in the major league. His performance on the field earned him a FTPN of 664, the third 
highest following sluggers Barry Bonds and Sammy Sosa. The following are some of the other 
performance rich, but underpaid players of the major leagues. 
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Table Nineteen: Baseball's Rich, but Underpaid 
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Source: Ackman, Dan (2002). 
Another interesting calculation is that of the overpaid stars. These are the people who are 
getting paid at the top of the charts, those breathing the rarified air of over $2 million in pay, but who 
are performing at the very bottom. The league average FTPN is 420; all of these players fall right around 
that mark. Most interesting on this list is Derek Jeter, Yankee shortstop, who already has four World 
Series rings, gets paid over $14 million per season, but in only ranked at 473 for his FTPN. 
Table Twenty: Most Overpaid Stars 
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Source: Ackman, Dan (2002). 
And the final interesting note made by Forbes magazine is that of the Bargain Ballplayers. These 
are the players who are often at the start of their careers and are still getting paid less than one million. 
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Berkman and Pujols, two of the top ten players for the 2001 season, make this list. In 2001, the two of 
them made $505,000 between them, which is just a little more than Alex Rodriguez, the Texas shortstop, 
makes in one week. Here are the best bargains. 
Table Twenty-One: Bargain Bali Players 
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.. .. • Source: Ackman, Dan (2002). 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
The Forbes Total Production Number, as seen above, can be used in many different ways. The 
advantage of this statistic is that it takes the players performance and weighs the criteria differently. 
There is no calculation here for pitching statistics, however, which may prove to be a fault for the FTPN. 
Owners especially can use this number to prove to their organization and the player why a certain 
contact is being offered. It can also be used in salary arbitration. The mediators can look at these 
criteria and determine whether the player is receiving too little or too much. Player Performance 
Evaluations are also useful in the capital budgeting deciSions. 
The Forbes Total Production Number does have its faults. It does not allow for adjustments on 
things such as intentional walks, sacrifices, or outs. For the 2003 season, there has been much debate 
about whether a team should pitch to Barry Bonds or just take the walk. Most people would argue that a 
team should just take the walk instead of running the risk that Bonds blasts one out of the park. There is 
no adjustment made to the formula for an instance like this, which would skew the end number. The 
formula is adjusted for bases on balls and strike outs, but many times players are asked to make an 
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intentional fly out or bunt to advance a lead runner into scoring position or even score the run. The 
formula does not allow for adjustments to be made in these circumstances either. 
Jeff Sagarin Ratings 
Jeff Sagarin has been providing power ratings and player ratings to USA Today since 1985. A 
mathematics graduate, he provides ratings for a variety of different sports including college football, 
college basketball, Major League Baseball, professional football, professional basketball, professional 
hockey, volleyball, NASCAR, soccer and several other sports. His ran kings have proven value to the 
NCAA tournament selection committee and in 1998 the rankings also became an official part of the Bowl 
Championship Series of college football selection processes (Sagarin 2001). For Major League Baseball, 
Sagarin offers two different rating systems. 
The first of those rating systems is for batters only, where batters are listed in three tiers 
labeled A, B, and C. The choice of a tier in which a player falls is determined by the number of plate 
appearances that player made over the course of the season. The total number of plate appearances 
includes at bats, sacrifice hits, sacrifice flies, walks, and hit by pitches. Batters are ranked on five 
different categories, including: 
o Runs Scored 
o On Base (hits + walks + hit by pitch) 
o Total Bases 
o Runs Batted In 
o (Stolen Bases x Stolen Bases) / Stolen Base Attempts, where Stolen Base 
Attempts = Stolen Bases + caught Stealing (Sagarin 2002a) 
The end measurement in the case of Sagarin Ratings for Major League Baseball is the Predicted RPG, or 
predicted runs per game. The predicted RPG is a measurement of the runs per game scored if the entire 
line-up conSisted of the same one player playing all different positions. This measurement takes into 
account all of the players offensive statistics such as walks, noting intentional walks, hit by pitches, stolen 
bases, caught stealing, stolen bases, sacrifice hits, sacrifice flies, as well as the normal singles, doubles, 
triples, and home runs. And of equal importance, it takes into account the total outs made, including 
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sacrifice outs. The Sagarin Ratings also do not factor in the position of a player, which sometimes can 
alter the rating depending on the difficulty of the position (Sagarin 2002a). 
For example, Babe Ruth's predicted runs per game were 16.73 in 1920, 15.66 in 1921, and 
16.76 in 1923. Ted Williams, the only player to have over .400 as a lifetime average, had a predicted run 
per game value of 16.99 in 1941. And finally, Barry Bonds, in his remarkable home run hitting season 
had only a 14.82 as his predicted runs per game value in 2001 (Sagarin 2002a). 
The second set of ratings that Sagarin provides is for pitchers. Much like the batters, pitchers 
are ranked in tiers according to the number of innings pitched over the course of the entire season. 
Pitchers are also ranked on five categories including: 
o Innings Pitched 
o SQRT = (ERA x MOB) 
Note that MOB = (hits + walks + hit by pitch) per nine innings 
o Rickey = (Innings Pitched -Hits) + (SO - (walks + hit by pitch) 
o Wins 
o Saves (Sagarin 2002b). 
The end measurement for pitchers is the predicted ERA, or earned run average. The predicted ERA is 
what the pitchers ERA "should be" given his raw statistics normalized to composite major league play of 
1946 through 1999. The average pitcher will have a normalized predicted ERA of 3.87 (Sagarin 202b). If 
the pitchers are normalized, that means that their predicted ERA's are what they would have achieved if 
they had pitched in the hypothetical composite major leagues of 1946 through 1999. Rickey, one of the 
criteria on which a pitcher is evaluated, is a measurement of the pitcher's power, calculated by finding 
the difference between innings pitched and hits, and adding on the value of strike outs minus walks and 
adding on hit by pitches (Sagarin 2002b). 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
The advantages of this system versus the Forbes Total Production number is that Sagarin 
ratings have different systems for batters and pitchers, where the FTPN only provides an estimation for 
the batter data. Obviously, if a team chose to use the FTPN for their batters, they would also have to 
seek another rating to evaluate their pitchers. The Sagarin ratings become helpful because all of the 
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calculations for all of the members of the team can be done in one place. Like the FTPN though, the 
Sagarin ratings are useful for calculating the present performance of a player, but have no implications 
for future estimations for either batters or pitchers. 
Another advantage of the Sagarin ratings is that their creator, Jeff Sagarin, already calculates 
them on a per season basis. The owner, arbitrator, or even the player can seek out the information that 
is already calculated on a certain player. There is no time or effort expended to creating the information 
on his or her own. Though the FTPN is not a difficult number to calculate, the person seeking the 
information must take the time to gather and calculate the information on his or her own time. The 
calculations are done cumulatively from the start of the season, so data is available from the firs pitch 
thrown. 
An advantage of this method is that the Sagarin ratings for batters are not determined by the 
position of a certain player, it is calculated as if the player played all nine of the positions. Many people 
feel that some positions are easier than others, therefore when evaluating a player their position should 
also be weighted. The Sagarin ratings alleviate this problem by using the player in all nine positions. 
The disadvantage is that the Sagarin ratings for pitchers do not take into account the differences in 
starting or relief position players. These two conditions lead to dramatically different results and mound 
appearances. Though it is believed to not have an impact on the outcome of the Sagarin rating, it is 
thought that pitchers should have their appearances weighed the same as batters do for the differences 
in their positions. Due to the many advantages and despite the disadvantages, the Sagarin ratings are 
self-proclaimed to be "the best real-life measure of the player's true offenSive value" for both the batting 
and pitching statistics (Sagarin 2002). 
Sabermetrics 
Sabermetrics is more of a movement than it is one actual statistic. The people who are 
interested in baseball statistics and actually take the time to create their own sets of statistics are known 
as sabermetricians. SABER comes from the acronym for the Society for American Baseball Research, and 
sabermetrics is also seen spelled sabrmetrics. 
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Bill James, the man credited with starting this movement, defined sabermetrics as "the search 
for objective knowledge about baseball," thus sabermetrics attempts to answer objective questions such 
as "which player on the Chicago Cubs contributed the most to the team's offense" or "how many home 
runs will Sammy Sosa hit next year" (Grabiner 1999). Since sabermetrics is an objective study of the 
game, it is necessary to use logical reasoning. A hypothesis can be developed from the information, 
either from the statistics or from an observation, and can be directly tested using these theories. 
Since the goal of a baseball team is to win more games that any other teams and the team has 
little control over the number of games that the other teams win, the goal is essentially to win as many 
games as possible. Therefore, it becomes of interest to measure a player's contribution to the team's 
wins (Grabiner 2002). The most common uses of statistics are to evaluate past performance and to 
predict future performance. 
There are five main areas that the sabermetrics movement focuses on, which include 
o Runs Predicted Formulas 
o Park Factors 
o Interpreting Minor League Stats 
o Age 
o Pythagorean Formula (Tomlinson 1997) 
There are formulas for estimating the number of runs that will be produced by a hitter, and these 
formulas depend heavily on on-base percentage (aBP) and slugging percentage (SLG). Batting average 
does not correlate well with the runs predicted, and runs batted in and runs scored are poor choices to 
include because these two variables depend on the success of the batters around the player (Tomlinson 
1997). In the most simplest form, the formula for Runs Predicted = aBP + SLG + AB, where AB stands 
for At Bats. An almost equivalent formula is Runs = (Hits + Walks) x (Total Bases) / (At Bats + Walks). 
These two formulas are in their simplest forms. Sabermetricians would take these simple formulas make 
additions and deletions depending on their opinions and what they are trying to measure, and produce 
their own more complex formula. These formulas account for a situation where the one player is in all 
nine of the pOSitions, much like the Forbes Total Production Number. General Managers would find that 
the runs predicted formulas are benefiCial in the evaluation of a player. 
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The park factors are another focus area of sabermetricians. Different parks produce different 
results for different players and teams. Why is this true? That is what the sabermetricians of this area 
attempt to answer. For example, many people believe that the Colorado Rockies are a great hitting 
team. Their stadium is elevated much higher than most other stadiums, moving them farther away from 
the center of gravity, therefore making it easier to hit at Coors Field than somewhere else. It is proven 
that at Coors Field the two teams combined hit an average of 14.3 runs per game, but put those two 
teams at another stadium and the average runs per game drop to around 4.25. Batting averages are 
influenced and inflated ten to fifteen percent because of park factors (Tomlinson 1997). Therefore park 
factors should be another determinant factor when general managers and owners are estimating the 
performance of a certain player or of a team. 
Minor league statistics are useful as major league statistics for predicting future performance 
(Tomlinson 1997). These minor league statistics have to be adjusted for park factor and according to the 
tougher competition of the major leagues. Formulas developed in this area do those two things, one set 
assists in the determination of the adjustments made for the majors versus minors and the other set 
actually takes those adjusted numbers and attempts to predict the performance of a minor league player 
in the major leagues. This statistic becomes useful for managers in situations of calling up reserve 
players from the AAA leagues, those players that may be acquired in trades for other players, and overall 
just to see if there is the possibility that someone on one of the farm teams may be a better investment 
than the "purchase" or contract of an already proven big league player (Tomlinson 1997). 
On average players tend to improve until the age of twenty-seven, and decline once they past 
this mark (Tomlinson 1997). How was this number determined? By sabermetricians and their developed 
formulas of course. According to Bill James, "the peak period for ball players is not twenty eight to thirty 
two as once believed, but twenty five to twenty-nine" (Tomlinson 1997). Though there are many 
exceptions to this number, most often this number holds true. Though a player should not be 
discriminated against because of their age, it is important to look at the fact that there is the possibility 
that once the player reaches a certain age there is the chance that their performance will decline. 
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The final category of the sabermetrics statistics is the Pythagorean formula. This allows for the 
prediction of a teams winning percentage by taking its runs scored and dividing by the sum of its runs 
scored squared and its runs allowed squared (Tomlinson 1997). The Pythagorean Formula is as follows: 
Pythagorean Formula = Runs Scored' / (Runs Scored' + Runs Allowed'). 
This formula provides the link between run productions and wins. As with all of the other areas, there 
are basic formulas that are then manipulated to the sabermetricians standards and used to predict 
certain variables. This statistic is useful for estimating the number of wins that a player would add to the 
team and can be computed before the team spends millions to acquire that person. 
Though these are not the only statistics that are possible, here are a few of the popular 
formulas of sabermetrics and how they are calculated: 
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Table Twenty-Two: Sabermetrics Formulas 
Name of Formula What Is Measured Formula Explanation 
A - Hits + Walks + Hit by Pitch + Caught 
Stealing - GIDP 
B = Total Bases + .26(Walks + Hit by Pitch) + 
Bill James' Runs Batting Statistics - .53(Sacrifice Flies + Sacrifice Hits) + 
Created (RC) Offensive Production .64(Stolen Bases) - .03(Strikeouts) 
C = At Bats + Walks + HBP + SF + SH 
Runs Created = ((A + 2.4C) x (B + 3C)) / (9C) 
-0.9C 
On-base percentage Short-form sabermetric of On Base Percentage (OBP) = (H + BB + HBP) 
plus Slugging player evaluation / (AB + BB + HBP + SF + SH) 
Percentage Slugging Percentage (SLG) = (H + 2B + 2(3B) 
+ 3(HR)) / AB 
On base slugging (OPS) = OBP + SLG 
Measuring the ability of a 
player to excel in two 
Bill James' Power fascinating, yet unlinked (2 x HR x SB) 
Speed Number (PSN) categories, homeruns and PSN = ---------------
stolen bases (HR + SB) 
Answers the question: 
What would the winning OffenSive Winning Percentage = 
percentage of a team, 
Bill James' Offensive assuming average pitching (Player Runs Created / 27 Outs)' 
Winning Percentage and defense, composed of ------------------------------------------------------.-----
a lineup of nine of a certain League Runs Per Game' + (Player Runs Created / 27 
player Outs)' 
Park Adjusted Earned Record of what a pitcher 
Run Average has done, adjusted to filter ERAp = ERA / park factor 
out park effects 
An estimation of what the 
Bill James' Component pitchers ERA should be ERC = {[(H - HR) x 1.225 + HR x 4] x 0.89 + 
ERA (ERC) based on the amount of (BB + IBB + HB) x 0.56} x {HB + H + BB} / 
hits, homeruns, and walks (Total Batters Faced) 
that are given up 
Comphed From. StatistiCS (2000). James Fraser's Sabermetncs Page [website anhne]. Accessed February 19, 2003. Available 
Online: httD:/Iwww.baseballstuff.camlfraserlstats2000Istats.html. Internet. 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
As said in the beginning of this section, sabermetrics is more of a movement than one actual 
formula that can be used to calculate a statistic. The possibilities of statistics using the sabermetrics 
calculations are virtually limitless. Unlike the Forbes Total Production Number and the Jeff Sagarin 
Ratings, which are limited by one formula, there are statistic estimations available for both individual 
players, including batting and pitching, and for team performance. 
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The disadvantage of using the sabermetrics system is that there really is nowhere to find 
already calculated data. The sabermetricians publish their theories and formulas, but only provide 
selected data on a few players and not the league overall. This differs from the Sagarin ratings where 
each player has his own statistics calculated based on the number of times that player has appeared at 
the plate. Jeff Sagarin provides a running total of the statistics of his players from the start to the finish 
of the season. The Forbes Total Production Number, on the USA Today website, provides data for all of 
the players as of the 2001 season, but has no updated numbers. 
Overall Summary 
All of the three mentioned statistics allow for the measuring of individual performance, 
independent of what other players do. Sabermetrics alone allow for the measuring of the player 
performance based on what others do also. It is important that a player should be evaluated for what he 
does, not for what his teammates or a manager does when it comes to the idea of contract negotiations 
and possible trading. This is a problem with statistics such as runs scored because unless the batter hits 
a home run or steals home, he needs the contributions of one of his teammates to score that run. 
Statistics should also take into account factors that the players might not have control over, for example 
the park factors. 
The best way to evaluate whether or not the statistics that have been calculated are accurate 
is as follows. If a player's statistics change considerably when he changes teams, parks, or lineup 
positions, this suggests that the outside effect has a major effect on the statistics. If the statistic remains 
constant when outside conditions change, this means that it is measuring the player's own contribution 
(Grabiner 1999). 
Statistics may also not be useful if they are trying to measure something that has a very small 
sample size or number of occurrences. For baseball fans that often times watch the games teleVised, this 
is an important aspect. For example, many times the announcer is heard as saying something like, 
"Barry Bonds is two for five against right handed pitchers on games that fall on Sunday's". Who really 
cares about this fact? The number of games that Barry Bonds hit in on Sunday's against right-handed 
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pitchers is probably less than ten. Considering that a player could have hundreds of plate appearances 
over a season, the five times of this occurrence really has nothing to do with the overall statistics. Put 
the statistic into this prospective. If two out of five people in the community voted one way, that would 
mean nothing if it was two of five or twenty of fifty, but quite a lot if it were two hundred of five 
hundred. 
Value Implications 
So what does the team value and player values have to do with the success of the team? The 
first goal of a baseball team is to win, a given point. The second goal, which may be a little more 
important, is to have fans in the stands at these wins. Since fans are of importance to value but have no 
direct correlation with wins, it is more important to look at the fans as part of the goal. Attendance at 
individual games is proven to be higher when the home teams played in a newer stadium and in a 
market with a larger population; when either the home or visiting team or both had recently won its 
division and was currently leading or close to the top of its division; when both starting pitchers had good 
current and/or lifetime records; when the game was played on a weekend or during the final two-thirds 
of the season; and when the game was part of a doubleheader or special promotion (Fitzel 1996). 
Attendance at individual games is proven to be higher when the home team played in a newer 
stadium and in a market with a larger population (Fitzel 1996). Cities desiring to acquire or retain sports 
franchises have invested millions of dollars in building stadiums, constructing parking facilities and other 
infrastructure, and even guaranteeing ticket sales to make their city more attractive to potential teams. 
Why would a city want to do something like this? No matter the value of the team or the market size, 
once a city has a team, they are usually not too willing to let it go. Professional baseball teams, in 
addition to the three major other professional sports, bring revenue to the city that they are located in. 
Additional money is spent at hotels, restaurants, bars, and other entertainment cites during days and 
times that games are being played. This increased value is reflected both in the city of location and in 
the value of the team, based on the increases of fans in the location. Since market size is not something 
that a team has control over, they must attempt to attract as many fans as possible. 
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Attendance at individual games is proven to be higher when either the home team or visiting 
team or both has recently won its division and was currently leading or close to the top of its division. A 
perfect example of this is happening right now during the 2003 season. The Detroit Tigers started their 
season off with a one and seventeen win-loss record. Even the die-hard fans that have supported the 
team through the ups and downs have started to quit attending the games. No one wants to spend the 
money to attend a game that they believe the team will lose. The same is happening with the Chicago 
Cubs. The Cubbies are off to one of their best starts in decades and are currently leading their division. 
Now, there are people coming out of the woodwork, claiming to have been fans through the losing 
seasons also, but really are those people who are defined as "season fans," the people who suddenly like 
a team or begin to follow a new team because of their unusual success. The Anaheim Angels faced this 
same situation last year. They had a rough start and a powerful finish, ending up being the National 
Champions. By the end of the season the team was experiencing sell-outs and full capacity crowds, 
something they could not have done at the beginning of the season. The success of the team is also 
reflected in the statement attendance at individual games is proven to be higher when the starting 
pitchers both had good current and/or lifetime records. The fans of these people increase as their 
records and popularity increase. 
Attendance at individual games is proven to be higher when the game was played on a 
weekend or during the final two-thirds of the season. The main effect that seems to be directly related 
to the value success of the team off the field is the prices charged to see a game on the field. Obviously, 
it would be expected that a team such as the New York Yankees or Arizona Diamondbacks would be able 
to charge more per seat to get fans into the stands. Smaller market and less successful teams are 
catching on to this trend of ticket pricing. The Cubs, who possess a decent size market and an 
abundance of local broadcasting revenues, announced that for the 2002 season they would be raiSing 
their ticket prices by as much as twenty-five percent. Other teams such as the Baltimore Oriels and 
Texas Rangers have also made announcements as to this effect. The logic behind the introduction of a 
tiered system of ticket pricing it to charge higher prices for the prime dates, regular prices for the 
majority of the games, and half price value days for some in between. For some teams, prime dates can 
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include opening day, weekend games, or even games where the "stars" are coming to play. In smaller 
market areas, teams are charging more for home games when teams such as the Yankees, defending 
champions Anaheim Angels, or so forth are coming to play. 
Focusing on the Cubs, the prime dates for their season include opening day, and all weekend 
games from June 6th through August 17th, where prices are ranging from $15 for upper deck reserved 
seats to $30 for bleachers and $45 for club boxes. On the value dates, which are Monday through 
Thursday games from April 7th to May 9th, the ticket prices are half of what it would cost for a regular 
game. Regular dates, all of those games that do not fall as prime or value days, have ticket prices 
ranging from $12 for upper deck reserved seats, $24 for bleacher seats, and club box seats ranged from 
$32 to $36. At the time of the announcement, Cubs director of ticket operations Frank Maloney wrote in 
the letter to season ticket holders, "[The Cubs] believe that this new pricing plan more accurately reflects 
the actual demand for our tickets and provides better purchasing options for our fans" (Cubs 2002). 
Attendance at individual games was higher when the game was part of a double header or a 
special promotion. The double-header aspect falls under the same ideas of the tiered ticket pricing 
strategy. More can be charge when there are two games back to back. Other ideas of special 
promotions could be bring a kid to the game day, retired veterans day, or some other type of an event 
where a certain target market is focused on to be attracted to the game. Special promotions are used in 
an attempt to attract people to the game that would not normally come under regular circumstances. 
These special days provide events and exhibits that would be of interest for that niche market, which 
hopefully would attract more people to the game. 
THESIS STATEMENT AND HOW PROVEN 
The purpose of this paper was to show how professional baseball franchises can afford to pay 
their players such large amounts of money and still be operarable for the season. Looking at the 
valuation equation, which is present value of future earnings or incomes, and then looking at the income 
formula, which is revenues minus costs, explained each of these variables throughout the paper. 
46 
Upon applying the data, we have arrived at the conclusion that the main way that professional 
baseball franchises can afford to pay some of their players such high salaries is because of the 
"Hollywood" effect, described above, that has become a popular trend in recent seasons. This is where 
the top players are paid large amounts of money, following along the 80-20 rule. The star players, 
roughly twenty percent, are brought in at eighty percent of the payrolls. This means that the other 
eighty percent of the players are only earning twenty percent of the payrolls. Even though the salaries 
for a few of the top players have risen to astronomical amounts, some players are left trailing behind. 
Also as a result of this "Hollywood" effect is the widening gap between average and median 
salaries. Because of the very few high salaries, the averages are growing at a rapid pace also. The 
increases in the median salaries are not growing as quickly, because there are more players being paid 
less money so that teams can afford the star players. If more attention was paid to this growing margin, 
the possibility of slowing the growth of the highest paid player salaries would be a poSSibility, as well as 
attempting to bring the average salary and median salary back to a more comparable figure. 
As presented in this paper, the formula for finding value is based on revenue minus costs, 
which determines value, which is the present value of future cash flows. When looking at the data 
compiled from Forbes Magazine and USA Today that was shown in Table ****, the current value of the 
team for the 2002 season, reported revenues and operating incomes can be seen. This table is a perfect 
example of how the current value is an estimation of the present value of future earnings. If the salary 
expenses are subtracted from the revenues, the number would be much smaller than the listed current 
value. The current value takes into account stadiums, player contracts, and other money that is spend 
on equipment, employees, and technology that is expected to payoff into the future. 
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Teams can afford to pay their players these higher salaries simply because they know that the 
large dollar amount of their future revenues are sufficient to support these figures. Teams know that in 
order to increase their revenues, they need to make the expenditures to get the players needed. But, by 
decreasing their costs, salary expenses as the main source, their revenues would increase automatically, 
so salaries are critical. 
The salaries of professional baseball players are not only useful as a variable in valuation of the 
teams that they play for, but also have an impact on other aspects of value. While revenues are 
increased for a team when big time players come to play for the team or come to play on an opposing 
team, variables like ticket sales, merchandise sales, parking fees, concessions, travel expenses such as 
hotels and food venues, all change when the quality of player or team. Teams could focus on some of 
the bargain players or underpaid stars that were explained using the Forbes Total Production Number. 
These players would not cost the team a lot of money, but would increase the winning percentage, 
therefore increasing the fans attending the games. 
Revenues of baseball teams are often lower than their current value would suggest since it is 
based on the present value of future earnings that are expected. Costs for teams are on the rise because 
of the increases in salaries. The owners of these professional baseball franchises must find a way to 
continue to increase their revenues and future earnings or decrease salaries. This is the main way that 
they will be able to increase their value. 
Conclusions 
Baseball is not just a game of balls and strikes; it is also big bUSiness, with teams worth more 
than a quarter billion dollars and players that are earning more than top entertainers and corporate 
executives. In the business of baseball, the products are the games themselves, presented by its players 
as entertainment. This entertainment is consumed by the public through live viewing or more commonly 
through print media, radio, and television. Bill Veeck, former major league owner and executive sums it 
up quite nicely, "No one really believes that baseball is not a bUSiness, what we really believe is that 
baseball is entitled to a special exemption because of its special character and the special position that it 
48 
holds in the national life" (Demmert 1973). This puts the participants of this business, the players, into a 
special category also. Baseball is America's pastime, it always has been, and even though it has become 
a source of controversy, American's love this game. 
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